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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

fession will not be automatically voided without a
careful consideration of the effect of the coercive
practices upon the accused. On the other hand, the
conviction will be affirmed when the accused knows
"the dance is over and the time has come to pay
the fiddler.";'
The best guide for the states is a list of just what
factors the Court will look at to balance against
the defendant involved. They were well sum,7Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186 (1952).

marized by another writer: "1) Number of questioners; 2) health, age, education and race of the
defendant; 3) time held incommunicado; 4) delay
before arraignment; 5) length of questioning,
deprivation of refreshment, rest or relief during
questioning; 6) threats or promises of benefit made;
7) hostility of questioners; 8) defendant's experience in ways of crime; and 9) living conditions
during detention."' $
7833 NEB. L. REv. 507, 508 (1954). See also 1954
WAsH. U. L. Q. 82, 83 n.9. (1954).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Double Jeopardy: State Conviction Following
Federal Acquittal; Federal Conviction Following
State Conviction-Petitioner was tried and acquitted in a federal district court for the robbery
of a federally insured savings and loan association.
He was subsequently tried and convicted in an
Illinois court on an indictment reciting facts
substantially identical to those recited in the
prior federal indictment. The evidence gathered
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the
federal prosecution together with evidence
gathered subsequent to the acquittal was turned
over to the state authorities. The sentencing of
confessed accomplices, who had testified against
petitioner in the federal prosecution, was delayed
until after they had testified in the state prosecution. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the
majority, reiterated the Court's position that the
fifth amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy is inapplicable to the states. While the
record showed dose cooperation between federal
and state authorities, it did not "sustain a conclusion that the state prosecution was a sham and a
cover for a federal prosecution, and thereby in
essential fact another federal prosecution." Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
Two dissenting opinions were registered. Justice
Black, who was joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas, insisted that the fourteenth
,amendment guarantee of due process prohibited
the state prosecution. Whether the historical
justification for the abhorrence of double prosecutions is the "injustice inherent in two punishments
for the same offense" or the "dangers to the innocent from allowing the full power of the state to be
brought against them in two trials," the fact that
two separate sovereignities conducted the prosecu-

tions should not alter the result. Justice Brennan,
who was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Douglas, insisted that the state court conviction
violated the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment because it was so dominated by
federal officers that it was in actuality a second
federal prosecution.
In a case decided the same day, Abbate v. U.S.,
359 U.S. 187 (1959), the Court upheld a conviction
for conspiracy to destroy parts of a federally
operated and controlled communications system.
Petitioners had previously been convicted in an
Illinois court, on identical facts, for conspiracy
to destroy the facilities of the telephone company.
The majority, through Justice Brennan, held that
the double jeopardy clause did not bar successive
state, and federal prosecutions, insisting that if
"state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based
on the same acts, federal law enforcement must
necessarily be hindered." The defendant's acts
were thought to "impinge more seriously on a
federal interest than on a state interest." If successive state and federal prosecutions were prohibited,
the state convictions resulting in prison sentences
of three months would bar federal prosecution
which could result in five years imprisonment. In
that event, the federal interest, i.e. national
security, would be inadequately protected. The
dissent, however, insisted that Congress could
adequately protect the federal interest, without
forcing defendant to undergo double prosecutions,
either by taking exclusive jurisdiction over the
crime or by allowing the states concurrent jurisdiction and setting minimum penalties which would be
applicable in both state and federal courts.
Unsworn Statements of State's Witnesses
Taken by Prosecutor During Investigation Leading
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to Indictment on Information Is Not Subject to

Compulsory Process-During trial petitioner filed
application for a subpoena d.ces tecur to compel
the production of stenographic notes of statements
made by the state's witness to the prosecutor
during his investigation to determine whether
charges should be filed against defendant on information. The trial judge denied the subpoena. The
denial was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court.
The defendant here petitioned for certiorari and
the court held that the statements taken by the
prosecutor "were in effect the work product of the
solicitor and were not subject to production."
Bedami v. State, 112 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1959).
Petitioner claimed that he needed the statements
held by the prosecutor to impeach the state's
witness and claimed his right to compulsory
process under the Florida Constitution. The court
held that the petitioner's right under compulsory
process ran to records "regularly made in due
course of legal procedure." Here the solicitor took
an unsworn statement of the witness thus rebutting
the premise that the information was gathered in
due course of legal or judicial procedure. In
Florida the prosecutor is not limited to file indictment only on information sworn to but may also
rely on other information. The court stated that
prosecutor's notes could not have been offered as
direct evidence but could have been used by him
for cross-examination or to refresh the witness's
memory.
Confessions Obtained in Post-indictment Interrogations Are Subject To Careful Scrutiny For
Coercion-Defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder in a New York court. Admitted into evidence at the trial was a confession made after he
had been indicted for the crime. The confession
was secured without the presence of a previously
retained counsel and after almost eight hours of
continuous night-time relay questioning. Other
factors cited as evidencing that the confession was
neither voluntary nor trustworthy were that
petitioner was of foreign birth, had a meager
education and a history of emotional irstability,
that the confession was in the form of questions
and answers, and that a large number of officials,
including a skillful prosecutor, were present at the
interrogation.
The defendant had called a fledgling police
officer, a childhood friend, to relate that he wished
to surrender. At the time of the interrogation, the
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police officer was instructed to falsely state that
the phone call had placed his job in jeopardy, the
loss of which would be disastrous to his three
children, his wife and his unborn child. The United
States Supreme Court, on certiorarito the Court of
Appeals of New York, reversed, holding that the
use of the confession was inconsistent with the
fourteenth amendment under traditional principles
since "petitioner's will was overborn by official
pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused."
Spano v. New York, 27 U.S. L. WEEK 4483, (U.S.
June 22, 1959).
Crucial to the Court's decision appeared to be
the absence of a laudable motive on the part of the
authorities for questioning the defendant. Since
an eye-witness was available and petitioner had
already been indicted, the police were said to be
not merely attempting to solve a crime or to
exonerate a suspect but to convict petitioner.
Motive and not method now appears to be the
most significant test of whether a confession is
voluntary. The concurring opinions emphasized
that the failure to summon the defendant's
counsel to the interrogation session, upon petitioner's request, was by itself sufficient grounds
for reversal.
Delinquency Proceedings Must Safeguard
Constitutional Rights-Barkus, a minor, was committed to a training school for a period not to
exceed his minority in a special statutory proceeding. He was accused of trespassing upon
railroad property and of placing a cement block
upon the railroad tracks. The statute provided
that an inquiry into alleged delinquency should be
conducted in a "summary manner." Petitioner
was brought before the juvenile court without a
summons and was not advised of his right to obtain
legal assistance nor of his right to refuse to testify
against himself. Admitted into evidence at the
hearing were the results of an ex parte investigation, conducted by the juvenile authorities, which
consisted exclusively of hearsay statements taken
without benefit of oath. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska reversed the order of commitment, holding that the essential procedures
established to aid the court in determining contested issues of fact could not be dispensed with in
juvenile proceedings. State v. Barkus, 95 N.W.2d
670 (Neb. 1959).
The court insisted that the issue upon appeal
was not petitioner's innocence or guilt but whether
the procedures utilized to obtain and present the

